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ABSTRACT 
The Greek-Turkish dyad is one of the oldest rivalries between neighbours. 
Since 1999 Greek-Turkish relations are in a state of détente and there 
have been many attempts to resolve their outstanding differences (Aegean, 
Cyprus, minority issues) but until now little has come out of these efforts 
although both sides are committed to an overall settlement. Our thesis is 
that this lack of progress is due to the fact that various incompatible 
conflicts are but the tip of the iceberg. The real reasons for the impasse, 
the essence of the rivalry, are the following ensemble (which is presented 
in detail in this paper): historical memories and traumas, real or imagined 
that are part and parcel of their national narratives together with their 
respective collective identities which are built on slighting and demonizing 
the ‘Other’. Only if this aspect of the conflict is fully addressed will Greece 
and Turkey be able to settle their ‘objective conflicts of interests’ and 
embark on a process of mutually beneficial reconciliation.                
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 The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry:  
National Narrative and Identity 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Greek-Turkish rivalry is one of the few oldest enduring conflicts between 
neighbors worldwide. From mid-1999 onwards relations are in a state of 
détente and there have been many attempts to resolve their outstanding 
differences (Aegean, Cyprus, minority issues) but until now very little has 
come out of these efforts and the occasional shows of good will, even though 
both sides are committed to an overall settlement and a final reconciliation. 
And the rivalry rumbles on at low ebb in spite of its staggering economic and 
other costs to both sides (armaments, militarization of border regions, costly 
over-flights of military aircraft and dangerous dogfights in the Aegean, the 
spending of valuable diplomatic and other capital that could have been spent 
more productively elsewhere).  
The continuing Greek-Turkish antagonism is perplexing to outsiders who point 
to the following:  
1. The borders between Turkey and Greece have been set, conclusively, at 
the Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947) peace treaties; the remaining 
boundary  disputes, namely those in the Aegean, are on water and in the 
air and are more amenable to a logical and just settlement. 
2. There are no claims over the other country’s territory as was the case 
until 1922. Both parties have officially claimed (from 1929 until today) 
that they harbour no territorial ambitions vis-à-vis the other side. There 
is little reason not to doubt the sincerity of these claims, that both sides 
are bona fide status quo states (leaving aside the case of Cyprus in 
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bygone days) irrespective of the doubts that linger on about the true 
intentions of the other party. 
3. There have been two decades of cordial relations (1930s and 1945-54) in 
addition to the recent detente, as a result of a political will at the highest 
level, which implies that the road to an eventual rapprochement is far 
from far-fetched but a distinct possibility worth pursuing. 
Yet the Greek-Turkish rivalry drifts on with remarkable abandon. Could it be, 
as Henry Kissinger had once put it, that the conflict is centuries-old and 
emotional and defies rationality (Kissinger 2000: 192, 195)? 
The first tangible Greek-Turkish conflict following the Second World War was 
the Cyprus problem from the 1950s onwards. A second objective conflict of 
interest is the intricate Aegean difference, which includes at least six distinct 
disputes.1 Minority questions are also a constant point of friction together with 
issues related to the Patriarchate in Istanbul. All these questions however 
complex and of great importance to both parties are resolvable provided there 
is an abundance of mutual good will and readiness for compromise by both 
parties.2 
 
2.  Three Paths Ahead and their Limitations 
At the outset it is worth remembering that in both countries there are many 
experts, diplomats and politicians that regard the rivalry as a given, as 
inevitable, along existential  lines within the logic of Carl Schmitt: ‘the Other’ 
(Andere) is the great ‘Enemy’ (Feind) that can never be ‘a friend’ (Schmitt, 
1932). Within this perspective, which was dominant in the two publics from 
                                                 
1
 See Wilson 1979/1980; Rozakis 1988: 269-492; Theodoropoulos 1988: 266-300; Pazarcı 1988: 101-
20; Aydιn 1997: 115-22; Syrigos 1998; Acer 2003; Bölükbaşι 2004; Heraclides 2001, 2010: 167-219. 
2
 This has been convincingly argued by specialists on Greek-Turkish affairs and several insiders. See in 
particular: Wilson 1979/1980: 1-2, 27-29; Clogg 1983: 124-5, 128, 131; Couloumbis 1983: 124-30; 
Groom 1986: 147-8; Bahcheli 1990: 129-30, 152-4, 192-3; Haass 1990: 59-64; Heraclides 2001, 2010: 
151-4, 223, 228-31. Among insiders see former ambassadors Theodoropoulos 1988: 324-5; Stearns 
1992: 134-44; Tzounis 1990: 217-21. 
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1974 until the late 1990s and still far from a spent force, the only realistic 
strategies are deterrence, diplomatic victories (outwitting and cornering the 
adversary), the threat of armed violence and other paraphernalia of the 
traditional realist paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s.   
Those in Greece and Turkey that do not regard the Greek-Turkish antagonism 
as inevitable tend to follow the tradition of soft realism, pluralism/liberalism or 
constructivism. In practical terms they have tended to follow three paths in 
their attempt to cope with the Greek-Turkish rivalry.  
One path is to put the main emphasis on the settlement of the Cyprus problem 
that had derailed the cordial Greek-Turkish relations in 1954 and has poisoned 
them ever since. According to this line of reasoning as long as the Cyprus 
conflict looms in the Greek-Turkish horizon the bilateral differences would 
defy resolution. Conversely if the Cyprus conflict was resolved by the 
reunification of the island than the settlement of the Aegean and other points 
would be almost a child’s play. At political level this approach was first put 
forward by Greek leaders, Constantinos Mitsotakis (1990-1993) and more 
erratically by Andreas Papandreou (1985-1988). The Turkish stance for most of 
the time, prior to the rise of the AKP government (November 2002) was the 
Bülent Ecevit line, that the Cyprus problem was resolved in 1974. From 2003 
onwards primer Recet Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly stressed the need to 
resolve the Cyprus via reunification and more recently has said that with the 
resolution of the Cyprus problem the other differences would be easily 
resolved.  
Skeptics of this approach (including this author) argue that since the Cyprus 
question may not be resolved, at least not in the foreseeable future, this 
approach lacks pragmatism. Obviously it is to the interests of Greece and 
Turkey to resolve the Cyprus problem in a mutually acceptable way, preferably 
by reunification in a loose federal framework or if that proves impossible by 
way of a velvet divorce with the return of some 7-10% of the territory to the 
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Greek-Cypriots. But it is hardly for the two ‘motherlands’ to do so. Resolution 
has to be negotiated and accepted by the two communities in Cyprus; it cannot 
be imposed by Athens and Ankara, as bitter experience has shown (namely the 
1959 Zurich-London Agreements and their attempts in the period 1964-1970, 
starting with the 1964 US mediation by Dean Acheson) or by the UN for that 
matter (the attempt of all the UN Secretary-Generals from U Thant in 1964-
1965 to Koffi Annan in 1999-2004). The two Cyprus communities or one of 
them can – and has – repeatedly frustrated reasonable attempts at resolution 
from 1968-1974 (when the first promising inter-communal talks took place) 
until today (the recent inter-communal talks from 2008 onward under the 
auspices of UN Secretary-General Ban-ki Moon). It may well be that the 
Cyprus problem simply defies resolution via reunification (Heraclides 2011). 
Thus Greece and Turkey may have to learn to live with a divided Cyprus and 
not allow their relations to be marred as a result constantly frustrating their 
attempts at settlement of their many differences. Effective decoupling/delinking 
is called for: of the Cyprus problem from their bilateral relations that need to be 
settled once and for all. Put more emphatically, Greek-Turkish relations cannot 
be a hostage to the Cyprus problem. There is some evidence that this approach 
has gained ground in both countries from 2004 onwards that is from the final 
failure of the Annan mediation attempt (the rejection of the Annan Plan by the 
Greek Cypriots in March 2004).  
A second path is to tackle head on the various outstanding issues, namely those 
of the Aegean dispute. At a first glance the complex Aegean conflict appears 
zero-sum and very difficult to resolve for it involves delicate ‘national issues’, 
such as sovereignty, sovereign rights, oil reserves, freedom of the high seas and 
of the air, access to ports, security and prestige. But contrary to the Cyprus 
problem where it may well be that ‘no solution may be a solution’, this is not 
the case with the Aegean conflict, as seen by the two attempts at settlement (in 
the period 1975-81 and 2002-3), where the two parties seemed roughly in 
agreement as to the basic principles and parameters of a just and fair settlement 
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(Heraclides 2010: 108, 152-4) as well as the more recent talks from May 2010 
that appear promising. Arguably the tangible, objective conflicts of interest are 
not the real reason for intractability but the mutual fears as to the real aims of 
the other side.3 In the Aegean plane it needs to be amply demonstrated that 
Greece does not want to ‘strangulate Turkey’ by making the Aegean a ‘Greek 
sea’; and Turkey for its part is not contemplating ‘grabbing Greek islands’. The 
resolution of the Aegean conflict is long overdue now after more than a decade 
of dialogue on the Aegean within a spirit of détente (Heraclides 2010 & 2011; 
International Crisis Group, European Briefing No64, 2011).     
Critics of this approach point out that the attempts of 1975-81 and 2002-2003 
led to naught, as did the talks that continued from 2004 to 2009; that one of the 
parties or both were not ready to take the plunge for a variety of reasons. As for 
the more recent invigorated talks (from 2010 onward) it appears that Erdoğan is 
prepared to clinch a deal, but Greece under George Papandreou, who was 
initially very positive, has settled for a more drawn out process due to the fear 
of the domestic cost. Moreover with Turkey’s EU prospect fading away and 
EU membership less popular even in Turkey there is little impetus to regard the 
solution of the Aegean conflict as a priority however helpful it may be in 
heightening Turkey’s credentials for the EU and presenting Turkey as a 
constructive and friendly state in the region (reinforcing foreign minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s well-known “no problem with neighbours” thesis). But as 
time goes by least promising is the Greek side due to the country’s economic 
woes that seem unending (Greece is constantly on the brink of bankruptcy 
since 2009). This dismal state of affairs is hardly conducive to bold conciliatory 
moves on the Aegean plane for they will almost inevitably be labeled as a sell-
out by the opposition and the public given Greece’s present weakness and lack 
of international clout. The economic malaise has led to another negative 
reaction by Greek nationalists and like-minded “experts”: that Greece should 
                                                 
3
 See in particular: Wilson 1979/1980: 1-2,13,27,29; Clogg 1983:124-5,128,131; Couloumbis 1983: 
Groom 1986: 147-8,152; Bahcheli 1990:129-30,152-4,192-3; Haass 1990:59-64; Stearns 1992:134-44; 
Heraclides 2010. 
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appropriate the whole of the Aegean (the traditional Andreas Papandreou line 
from the 1970s and 1980s) and even beyond in the eastern Mediterranean 
(around the small island of Kastelorizo) which is supposedly replete with oil 
and other mineral resources and thus save Greece from bankruptcy. In this 
context another prospective dispute is surfacing in addition to the other six in 
the Aegean, the notion of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).     
But perhaps above all any deal on the Aegean plane entails compromises very 
difficult to swallow for both parties, not least due to the unrealistic expectations 
of both sides that have soared through the years due to the jingoist stance of 
leading politicians and the various extreme views presented in the media by 
nationalist “experts” in both countries.  
A third path is the one of low politics, mainly economic cooperation, contacts, 
tourism, and extended interaction at sub-governmental level on issues of low 
politics (Haass, 1990: 63-4; Birand, 1991: 28-9; Hale 2002: 66-7, 178-9). 
Hopefully after decades of enhanced cooperation that would lead to mutual 
trust, the Aegean dispute and the other outstanding bilateral differences may 
become ‘desecurited’ and more amenable to a settlement (Rumelili, 2007: 107). 
The outstanding issues of the Aegean and others may appear less salient and 
some issues may simply disappear from the agenda. At the very least after, say, 
two decades of contacts, economic cooperation and inter-governmental 
cooperation on low politics, the two sides may have the luxury to agree to 
disagree and, if things momentarily turn sour, focus on effective conflict 
prevention and crisis management.  
Skeptics of this approach point out that it remains an open question whether the 
functional or neo-functional logic can work in such a setting. It is probably too 
optimistic to regard economic cooperation and other transactions à la Mitrany 
potent enough to withstand a downward slide in high politics, triggered as a 
result of an episode in the Aegean that runs out of hand, continued deadlock on 
the Cyprus talks, a rise in nationalist frenzy in Greece or Turkey or a new 
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government or governmental coalition that favours antagonism and 
brinkmanship. Economic transactions are not always “win-win” (the Adam 
Smith expectation) but can become antagonistic in some areas. It is also 
doubtful whether economic cooperation can spill-over into high politics along 
the neo-functional logic, inciting a rapprochement and/or acting as a secure 
safety net against retrogression (Evin, 2005: 15-17; Öniş & Yιlmaz 2008: 125, 
131-34; Papadopoulos 2009: 289-314; Heraclides 2010: 226-8).   
Why have all three paths defied hopes and expectations until today? This is the 
case, I would argue, because the Greek-Turkish differences – the objective 
conflict of interest – are but the tip of the iceberg. What has made these 
differences impervious to a settlement are (a) the weight of history, mainly 
imagined history based on chosen glories and traumas that are buttressed by 
their respective national narratives, (b) coupled with their chosen collective 
identities which are built on slighting and demonizing the other party. This is 
the crux of the Greek-Turkish antagonism and less the tangible disputes as such 
(Clogg 1983: 128; Millas 1991, 2004a, 2005; Heraclides 2001, 2010: 223-4, 
231-3; Özkιrιmlι & Sofos 2008). Only if this aspect of the conflict is fully 
addressed will Greece and Turkey be able to settle their chronic disputes (bar 
Cyprus) and embark on a process of mutually beneficial reconciliation. 
Demonization and threat perceptions are pervasive. On the basis of their 
imagined history and chosen identity the Greeks (in their great majority) are 
convinced that Turkey is since 1974 (from the Cyprus mega-crisis) in the 
throes of ‘neo-Ottomanism’ and expansionism: to divide the Aegean into two 
parts and ‘ensnare’ the eastern Greek islands; grab Greek Thrace, if given the 
opportunity; and control all of Cyprus.4 The Turks for their part believe that 
Greece is swayed (since the mid-1950s) by the irredentist Megali Idea (Great 
Idea) of the period 1850-1922 (whose avowed aim was to conquer as many 
                                                 
4
 Almost all the Greek IR scholars and international lawyers, regard Turkey as threatening towards 
Greece. Among the moderates see:  Veremis 1982; Rozakis 1988; Veremis & Couloumbis 1994; 
Tsakonas 2010. Among the many hard-liners see: Valinakis 1990; Ioannou 1997; Economidès 1997; 
Syrigos 1998.    
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Ottoman territories as possible), though Athens now treads more carefully, not 
head-on but by using a careful legalistic stratagem, be it in the Aegean (to 
render it a ‘Greek lake’) or with regard to Cyprus (union with Greece until 
1974, ‘indirect union’ today via the EU from the mid-1990s onward).5  
 
3. Historical Narratives  
One of the most enduring beliefs in both countries is that the Greek-Turkish 
conflict is perennial, almost primordial; its origin and point of no return is to be 
found in the Middle Ages, at the battle of Manzikert in 1071, between 
Byzantine ‘Greeks’ and Seljuk ‘Turks’ (actually Orthodox Christian Romaioi 
against Sunni Muslim Seljuks); or according to a Turkish view even in distant 
antiquity in the legendary battle of Troy (with the Trojans presumably 
ancestors of the present-day Turks).6  
Along the perennial-primordial perspective the first phase of the encounter 
between the two peoples ends with the conquest of Constantinople by Mehmed 
II the Conqueror (1453). The second phase is the period 1453-1821, which is 
portrayed by the Greeks as 400 years of ‘Turkish occupation’ and ‘yoke’; and 
by the Turks as a model of tolerance and multiculturalism, in which the Greeks 
(the Rum as they called them) flourished as no other non-Muslim community. 
And the third phase of the clash is the period from 1821 (the start of the Greek 
War of Independence) until today or until 1999 for the more optimistic.  
                                                 
5
 See for such views the writings of noted Turkish academics and diplomats, including Çağlayangil 
2001 [1990]: 237-9; Pacarzι 1986, 1988: 103-4; Bilge 1989: 67-80, 2000; Gürkan 1989: 113-31; Gürel 
1993a, 1993b: 163-71; Elekdağ 1996: 33-57; Inan & Baseren1996: 60, 63; Gündüz 2001, 81-101: Arιm 
2001: 20-3, 26; Acer 2003: 48-9, 61, 143; Soysal 2004: 37-46; Bölükbaşι 2004: 15-35, 42-50, 62-72. 
6
 The Troy idea is of course outlandish, but there is an interesting vignette worth mentioning. Mehmed 
II, years after having conquered Constantinople, visited the legendary site of Troy and is reported to 
have said: ‘It was the Greeks … who ravaged this place in the past and whose descendents have now 
through my efforts paid the right penalty, after a long period of years, for their injustice to us Asiatics 
at the time and so often in subsequent times’.  This is written in Greek by the official biographer of 
Mehmed, Mihail Kritovoulos (a Byzantine) in History of Mehmed the Conqueror.  Apparently 
Mehmed was aware of a theory upheld at the time by some in Europe that the Ottomans, like the 
Romans before them, were the descendents of vengeful ‘Trojans paying back the Greeks’. See Kafadar 
1995: 9 & 150 endnote 12.    
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Primordialism is not only a popular belief among the two publics, but it is part 
and parcel of their respective national narratives. 
In Greece the dominant narrative is the one conceived by historian 
Constantinos Paparrigopoulos in the mid-19th century, the idea of over 3000 
years of uninterrupted history and of the existence of a ‘Greek nation’ since the 
Homeric days. In the mid-19th century this concept superseded the dominant 
narrative of the years 1821-1850, introduced by scholar Adamantios Korais. 
According to the first narrative the modern Greeks are ‘resurrected’ 
descendents of the Ancient Greeks; that ‘Greece’ was reborn after its demise in 
the 4th century B.C. like the mythical phoenix from its ashes. Paparrigopoulos 
incorporated the Macedonian and Byzantine eras in the Greek narrative and 
thus was able to achieve historical continuity and also provide a crucial 
synthesis between Ancient Hellenism and Christianity cum Byzantium, which 
however implausible is the self-evident truth for the Greeks (Nairn 1979: 32, 
34; Herzfeld 1982; Veremis 1990: 12-13; Tsoukalas 1999: 11-13; Liakos 2008: 
204-13; Özkιrιmlι & Sofos 2008: 80-5).  
From the 1970s onwards there are two other renditions of the Paparrigopoulos 
scheme with lesser influence: neo-Orthodoxy (theologian Christos Yiannaras 
and others) which exalts the role of Orthodoxy and of the Byzantine Empire; 
and a more scientific approach which puts the birth of modern Hellenism in the 
year 1204 (the Crusader conquest of Constantinople) (historians Apostolos 
Vakalopoulos, Nicos Svoronos, D.A. Zakythinos, Stephen Xydis and Speros 
Vryonis). The Paparrigopoulos and neo-Orthodoxy narratives fall under what 
Anthony D. Smith calls ‘continuous perennialism’, the view that ‘a particular 
nation has existed for centuries, if not millennia’ (Smith 2000: 5). The Korais 
line is a case of ‘recurrent perennialism’; that a nation may disappear and 
reappear in history (Smith 2000: 5). As for the 1204 school it falls under 
Adrian Hastings’s variant of perennialism that places the birth of some nations 
in the late Middle Ages (Hastings 1997).     
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The Turks do not have one dominant narrative but at least four competing ones 
(Poulton 1997: 101-9, 130-53,181-8; Millas 2006: 5-8; Özkιrιmlι & Sofos 
2008: 27-37, 60-75, 89-101, 123-44, 134-5): (1) the nationalist and pan-Turkic 
line from the 1910s (Landau 1995: 9-56, 74-97); (2) the Turkish History Thesis 
(THT), concocted in the late 1920s and early 1930s by lesser Turkish historians 
under the guidance of Kemal Atatürk (the then dean among Turkish historians, 
M.Fuad Köprülü kept his distance from the THT, see Ersanlι Behar, 1989: 167-
73); (3) the Anatolian thesis of the 1950s and 1960s (classicist Cevat Şakir, 
novelist Kemal Tahir and several leftist scholars) with roots in the 1920s; and  
(4) the Turkish Islamic Synthesis (TIS), from the 1970s (historian Ibrahim 
Kafesoğlu, Muharrem Ergin, Bozkurt Güvenç and others).  
The two main theoreticians of Turkish nationalism (first decades of the 20th 
century) are Yusuf Akçura (who stressed the ethnic-racial elements of 
Turkism) and Ziya Gökalp (who stressed common culture and a common belief 
system) and both were initially pan-Turkists as well. Pan-Turkism and other 
virulent nationalist approaches have not been able to dominate the scene, save 
in the dying days of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War (under the 
triumvirate of Enver, Talât and Cemal). This brings us to the THT which was 
to become the official historical dogma. The THT presents a glorious Turkish 
past since the dawn of history. The Turks are depicted as a very ancient people, 
as the creators of all the major ancient civilizations in Asia Minor, 
Mesopotamia and beyond, and the quintessential state-builders throughout the 
centuries. The THT downgrades the Ottoman past, surprisingly even the golden 
age of the empire (1350-1600). The Thesis was unassailable from the late 
1920s until the 1950s. By the mid-1970s it was silently dropped though never 
officially withdrawn.  
Anatolianism reacted to the far-fetched views of the THT, by trying to foster an 
Anatolian identity, in the sense that the Ottomans and the modern Turks are the 
cultural descendants of all the civilizations and peoples that had flourished in 
Anatolia. 
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The TIS links Turkish identity with Islamic identity. According to the 
Synthesis, the Seljuks and other Turkic ancestors of the Ottomans converted 
enthusiastically to Islam, which was suited to their culture and value system 
and became fervent Muslims and saved Islam from its decline. The TIS 
reinstates the Ottoman Empire and its heritage, and regards the Ottoman and 
Turkish legacy and culture superior by comparison to those of other peoples 
with whom the Ottomans and Turks have intermingled that differ from them 
ethnically and religiously. 
In the Greek case, despite certain disagreements between the dominant 
Paparrigopoulos narrative and the others, all agree that the Greeks have a 
history ‘as a nation’ of at least 3000 years; that the modern Greeks are 
descendents of the Ancient Greeks; and that the Turks are the traditional enemy 
and are ‘uncivilised’, essentially ‘barbarians’ till this day. They are also in 
agreement as regards the ‘Turkish yoke’ that severed the Greeks from their 
natural environment ‘civilised Europe’. 
The Turkish narratives disagree as to whether the Ottoman Empire was a great 
achievement, Turkish or a disgrace to Turkism. But they agree on one point: 
that it was tolerant to other religious communities and ethnicities, by the 
standards of the period a ‘paradise of cultural pluralism’, so much so that the 
non-Muslims and most of all the Rum (the Orthodox Christians subjects headed 
by the Greeks or Hellenised) and the Armenians thrived even more than the 
Muslims. Furthermore, all the Turkish national narratives (with the partial 
exception of Anatolianism) tend to ‘forget’ the pre-existence of the Ancient 
Greeks (Ionians) in Asia Minor, downgrade the Byzantine Empire and slight 
the modern Greeks.  
To further underline the role of narratives as a basic source of conflict and ill-
feeling between the two parties, let us sketch the dominant highly popular 
views of the Greeks and Turks regarding the ‘Other’. 
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The dominant Greek view regarding the Turks runs as follows: they are their 
oldest rivals, the worst and most vicious enemies imaginable, they are 
‘invaders’ (they have taken their ancestral lands) and ‘barbarians’ to boot. 
When they finally defeated the glorious thousand year ‘Greek Byzantine 
Empire’ (in 1453) they subjected the Greeks to the ‘Turkish yoke’, to ‘four-
hundred years of slavery and dungeon’, until the Greeks were finally able to 
free themselves in a heroic struggle for independence (1820s). Then at last the 
modern Greeks were able to follow their destiny, civilized Europe. In the last 
decades the aim of ‘inherently expansionist and aggressive Turkey’ is to grab 
as much of Cyprus as possible, the eastern Greek islands and Greek Thrace, but 
Greece will not allow this to happen for after all justice and international law is 
on the Greek side.7 
The dominant Turkish view is that the present-day Greeks are descendants of a 
motley group of Christians living under the decadent and tyrannical Byzantine 
Empire, who bear no relationship whatsoever to the Ancient Greeks. When 
conquered they were brought under the just and multicultural rule of the 
Ottoman Empire whence they thrived. Yet ungratefully and for no real reason 
they ended up by rebelling, with foreign (mainly Russian) connivance, against 
their ‘benefactors’. Since then they have been on the attack trying to extract 
Turkish territories along the infamous Megali Idea, always with the support of 
the Europeans (as in the 1820s), going as far as ‘occupying and invading’ the 
Turkish Anatolian homeland, to be driven out in the epic Turkish Liberation 
War. The more recent exploits of Greece as a revisionist state are the attempt to 
grab the whole of Cyprus, though it was never part of any Greek state, and to 
expand piecemeal in the Aegean by using legalistic stratagems. But Greece will 
not succeed in its devious schemes for justice is on the Turkish side and after 
                                                 
7
 For such presentations and their deconstruction see Millas 1991: 24-30; Millas 2002: 119-20 & 
passim; Millas 2005: 49-52; Papadakis 2005: 14-15 & passim; Heraclides 2010: 233 & passim. 
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all Turkey is a big and powerful country in the position to frustrate such 
schemes.8 
Needless to say this prevailing belief of the Greeks and Turks as nations prior 
to the age of modernity and of the other as the primary foe and the abode of 
evil, are later-day constructions. The respective national historical narratives 
are hardly ‘historical’ but retrospective; they purposefully forget and ignore 
affinities, periods of peaceful co-habitation and thriving in common between 
the two communities, in what amounted, to considerable extent, to a shared 
‘Ottoman-Levantine heritage’ and culture for centuries in the southern Balkans 
and the Near East (Groom, 1986: 152; Bertand, 2003: 7-28 Millas, 2004a; 
Evin, 2005: 5; Özkιrιmlι & Sofos, 2008: 9, 13; Heraclides, 2010: 15-24) a lost 
world, which ended dramatically within a dozen years from 1912 until 1924: 
with the 1st Balkan War (1912), the Greek-Turkish War (1919-1922) and the 
tragic eviction and compulsory exchange of populations of 1922-24 that 
involved almost two million people (Hirschon 2003; Clark 2006).  
 
4. An Identity-Based Conflict 
As Stuart Hall has pointed out, ‘identities are constructed through, not outside, 
difference ... it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is 
not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside 
that the positive meaning of any term and thus its “identity” – can be 
constructed ... identities can function as points of identification and attachment 
only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render “outside”... 
The unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as 
                                                 
8
 See Millas 1991: 24-30; Millas 2002: 120; Millas 2005: 54-56; Heraclides 2010: 235. For such view 
presented as the objective truth see: Bilge 1989: 68-80; Sonyel 1993, 1999; Gürel 1993a; Elekdağ 
1996: 34-9, 43; Bölükbaşι 2004: 5-72.  
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foundational is not a natural but a constructed form of closure ...’ [emphasis in 
the original] (Hall 1996: 4-5).  
In the Greek-Turkish context, as Hercules Millas has put it, ‘due to historical 
reasons each party conceives the “other” as a prospective threat or as a 
challenge to its identity and interprets each of his actions accordingly, creating 
a vicious circle…’ (Millas 2004a: 53). According psychoanalyst and conflict 
researcher Vamιk Volkan by portraying the other side as evil and full of 
negative traits, one projects those parts of oneself that he/she tries to deny. 
Projection serves to enhance self-esteem in contrast to the despicable ‘other’. In 
this context, Greeks and Turks have become the ‘significant negative other’; 
they need each other but as enemies. In the identity formation of Greeks and 
Turks ‘chosen traumas’ and ‘chosen glories’ are essential ingredients (Volkan, 
1988: 17-59, 99-105; Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1994: 1-12; Dragonas, 2003, 1-15). 
The famous verse of Constantine Cavafy from another context comes to mind: 
‘...what will become of us without barbarians? These people were a kind of 
solution’. 
It is also worth stressing that the enduring Greek-Turkish rivalry is one of very 
few instances in history where two national states have gained their 
independence after a bloody – and in several respects heroic - struggle against 
‘the Other’. This goes a long way to explaining the tenacity of the rivalry. In 
their respective wars of independence and other clashes (e.g. in Macedonia in 
the late 19th and early 20th century and in Cyprus from 1955 until 1974) there 
were arsons, massacres and other appalling atrocities, and a staggering trail of 
refugees. Such suffering further galvanised the two peoples as tragic and 
innocent victims of the other side (Hirschon 2003; Clark, 2006).  
In this context it is worth stressing that both sides have a detailed knowledge of 
the slaughters and other acts of cruelty, deceit, reneging and inhumanity of the 
other side notably in the course of the Greek War of Independence, the First 
Balkan Wars (1912) and during the Greek-Turkish War of 1919-1922 
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(“Turkish War of Liberation”) or in Cyprus. They tend to exaggerate these acts 
– and in recent decades they use terms such as ‘ethnic cleansing’ and 
‘genocide’ - but by and large and despite many exaggerations and several sheer 
lies, they are not way of the mark regarding the misdeeds of the other party. 
But the vast majority of Greeks and Turks are totally unaware of their side’s 
horrifying acts of barbarity in the 1820s, in 1912-1914 and 1919-1922. The 
very few acts that are acknowledged publicly are downplayed as exceptions to 
the rule and as understandable reactions given previous discrimination, 
maltreatment, slaughters and other misdeeds and provocations by the 
adversary.  
On the Greek side, a case in point is the atrocious onslaught of the Greeks and 
Hellenised Christian Albanians against the city of Tripolitza in October 1821, 
which is justified by the Greeks ever since as the almost natural and predictable 
outcome of more than ‘400 years of slavery and dudgeon’. All the other similar 
atrocious acts all over Peloponnese, where apparently the whole population of 
Muslims (Albanian and Turkish-speakers), well over twenty thousand vanished 
from the face of the earth within a spat of a few months in 1821 is unsaid and 
forgotten, a case of ethnic cleansing through sheer slaughter (St Clair 2008: 1-
9, 41-46) as are the atrocities committed in Moldavia (were the “Greek 
Revolution” actually started in February 1821) by prince Ypsilantis. Equally 
forgotten and untold are the arsons, plundering, killings and other acts of 
barbarity committed by the Greek Army (an organised army and not an 
onslaught by irregulars) in its Asia Minor campaign, which in the words of 
Venizelos had ‘terribly diminished’ the ‘moral standing [of Greece] in the 
civilized family of nations’ (see Clark 2006: 55).  
On the Turkish side, the killings of high-ranking Greek (Rum to be exact) 
officials of the Ottoman state (including the Patriarch Gregorios V who 
condemned the Greek Revolution) even though all of them were innocent and 
not involved in any way in the Greek uprising, the atrocious onslaught of 
peaceful and affluent island of Chios in March 1822, the similar carnage in 
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Psara in 1824, the devastating campaign of Ibrahim in Peloponnese in 1925-27 
are downplayed as a legitimate reaction to an unlawful uprising against their 
benefactors by the ungrateful Rum. Despicable acts committed upon the entry 
of the Turkish Army (a regular army and not irregular chettes) into 
Smyrna/Izmir, including the Turkish army’s role in allowing the beautiful city 
of Smyrna/Izmir to burn down, are swept under the carpet and presented as 
orderly entry with some mishaps that were exceptions and committed by a few 
individuals as a reaction to what they had suffered at the hands of the Greek 
invading army in the previous years (from the moment the Greek forces 
occupied Izmir in May 1919).  
 
4.1 Greek Identity and Demonization of the Turks 
In the Greek case the negative image of the Turks as backward, barbarian and 
prone to committing atrocities is an essential ingredient of the Greek self-image 
and identity. The objective is oblivion: to forget the skeletons in the cupboard 
which tell a different story that does not match with the dominant black-white 
imagery regarding the past (Millas 2004a). In particular the yoke/occupation 
notion is essential so as to expunge any hint of co-existence and almost 
partnership between Ottoman Muslims and Greeks (Rum) under Ottoman rule. 
Any questioning of the yoke idea, say by providing hard historical evidence to 
the contrary, creates uproar in Greece for it seen as undermining the raison 
d’être of Greek independence and statehood (Heraclides, 2010: 233-4).9 I 
                                                 
9
 In this regard two characteristic occurrences in recent years are worth mentioning. In 2006-2007, a 6th 
grade primarily school history text book, written by a group of historians under Dr. Repusi, which 
presented the Ottoman Empire in somewhat less damning terms (e.g. it undermined, among others, the 
famous “secret school” idea or the persecution of the “Greeks” qua Greeks in the Ottoman Empire) led 
to an overwhelming condemnation in Parliament, the press, TV and internet for many months. At the 
end the timid and incapable government of Costas Karamanlis caved in and abolished the book even 
though it had gone through all the appropriate bureaucratic channels and had been accepted as the 
textbook for the 6th grade (in Greece there is only one book for each subject contrary to most other 
countries). The education minister Dr. Marieta Yiannakou lost her job for insisting on retaining the 
book. A more recent example is the showing of a TV series on the Greek War of Independence, which 
in its first episodes chose to present the Ottoman state as less than hell on earth, undermined the idea of 
the secret school and referred to at least one Greek atrocity in the course of the Greek War of  
Independence, Tripolitza. The main academic advisor of the series is Professor Thanos Vermenis, a 
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would add another more hidden reason for the need for the ‘Turkish 
occupation/yoke’ ensemble: to justify the aforementioned massacres by the 
insurgent Greeks in the first year of the Greek War of Independence, when no 
Muslim (Albanian or Turkish speaker) was left alive in Peloponnese.10    
The urge to present the Turks as the antipode of civilisation is above all due to 
the following over-riding concern for the Greeks: by claiming direct descent 
from ‘the classics’ (the Ancient Greeks) the modern-day Greeks become one 
with the ‘cradle of civilisation’ and via the ancient Greek connection part of 
European civilisation and culture (Pesmazoglou, 1993: 383; Gourgouris, 1996: 
268; Tsoukalas 1999). As the late Stéphane Yerasimos had put it, ‘in order to 
sustain the major argument of being the defenders of civilisation, they must 
convince themselves and the world of the barbarism of the other … the 
ineptitude of the Turk to civilisation’ (Yerasimos, 1988: 39-40). Another road 
reinforcing ‘Turkish innate barbarism’ is the fact that the ‘Turk’ was for 
Europe the primary ‘Other’ and a barbarian one at that for centuries (Neumann, 
1999: 39-63). Hence the Greeks as ‘full-blooded Europeans’ appropriate that 
aspect of the package as well (Pesmazoglou 1993: 382-3) and regard 
themselves as the ‘vanguard of a European civilization fighting against the 
barbarians’ (Tsoukalas 1993: 66). Moreover the ‘barbaric’, ‘undemocratic’ and 
backwardness’ of the Turks and their ancestors (the Ottomans) is essential so as 
to present the Greeks as the very opposite: modern, progressive, democratic 
(Tsoukalas, 1999: 7-13; Isiksal, 2002: 121, 124), as true heirs of their ancestors 
who invented democracy.    
                                                                                                                                            
well-known historian with impeccable credentials as a mainstream realist scholar of Greek-Turkish 
relations (a soft realist as in the case of Theodore Couloumbis, his collaborator in the think tank 
ELIAMEP). The uproar this time though considerable is more nuanced given the fact that it is shown 
by a private TV channel and in view of Veremis’s reputation as a mainstream figure of the intellectual 
establishment. 
10
 These gruesome incidents may be unknown today to but a few Greeks but they were of course well 
known to the Greeks of that period, who when asked about the fate of their former neighbours, with 
whom they previously lived amicably, a typical reaction was that ‘the moon devoured them’. See St 
Clair 2008 [1972]: 1. 
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I suspect that there is also another reason for the Greek need to present the 
Turks as abominable creatures likely to commit the most terrible of crimes 
against humanity, from Chios and Psara in the 1820s to the ‘second invasion’ 
in Cyprus 1974. This done, it seems to me, so as to expunge – by an act of 
projection – the crimes of the Greeks against humanity in the 1820s in 
Peloponnese, in 1912-1913 (Balkan Wars) and in 1919-1922, not to mention 
the ill-treatment of the Turkish-Cypriots from December 1963 until November 
1967.     
Greece is self-defined as the quintessential country of ‘civilisation and history’. 
The end result of this self-identity is a haughty cultural arrogance and 
megalomania that in fact conceals an ‘existential insecurity’ that breads a 
defensive nationalism. By having chosen to identify themselves with the 
venerable Ancient Greeks as well as with the other major European 
civilisations (the British, French, Germans, Italians and so on) instead of with 
peoples and countries of their own size (for instance the Danes, the Hungarians 
or the Bulgarians), the Greeks of today end up feeling miserable by 
comparison. This is combined with an acute feeling of being alone in the world, 
of being ‘a brotherless nation’, even though Greece is in the EU family (the EU 
may appear less of a family in recent years, but this Greek perception was 
already entrenched in the 1980s). Most Greeks feel that they are constantly 
threatened by outside forces, foremost of all by Turkey, which inter alia is seen 
as having set up a menacing ‘Muslim Arc’ in the Balkans against Greece. The 
other neighbours of Greece are barely less hostile most of the time (with the 
exception of Bulgaria in the last decades). And there are also various other 
‘anti-Greeks’ (anthellines) to reckon with, ‘the scheming Americans, British 
and other western Europeans’ (today with Greece near bankruptcy the Germans 
have also joined the rank of anti-Greeks), presumably ‘constantly preoccupied 
with Greece’, day and night in the business of ‘conspiring to injure Hellenism’ 
(conspiracy theories abound even among intellectuals and academics). The 
injustice of it all – according to the great majority of Greeks – is that instead of 
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being admired, cherished and always supported (by virtue of being ‘the 
descendants’ of the original civilisers) the opposite is the case. As Nicos 
Mouzelis has sarcastically put it, the Greeks are utterly shocked when they 
discover that for some reason other states fellow a foreign policy aimed at 
safeguarding their own national interests instead of basing their foreign policy 
on the Greek national interests (Mouzelis 1994: 44). As for the Turks they are 
‘the favourite child of the Americans’ and of several western European states 
(Mouzelis, 1994: 42-3; Frangoudaki & Dragona 1997; Tsoukalas, 1999: 302-3; 
Heraclides 2001: 68-9).  
As regards the Aegean region (islands and sea) in particular it has become part 
and parcel of Greek national identity. According to the Pararrigopoulos grand 
narrative, the European and Asiatic parts of the Aegean were Greek territory 
since time immemorial and remained so until the fall of the Byzantine Empire. 
Hence the Aegean was unredeemed Greek territory until the Balkan Wars. 
Today Greece regards itself as a quintessentially Aegean country. The Aegean 
Sea and its islands became central in Greek representations. This shift in 
Greece's definition from a successful northward expansion until the early 20th 
century to the Aegean as an ʻincontestable territoryʼ in present-day self-
representations, goes a long to explaining the great sensitivity of the present-
day Greeks in the Aegean dispute vis-a-vis Turkey (Sofos and Özkιrιmlι 2009: 
29; see also Wilson 1979/1980: 3,29). Thus even the mention of the obvious 
fact that the Aegean happens to also be a Turkish sea (since Turkey is after a 
littoral state of the Aegean) is regarded as outrageous by the great majority of 
Greeks and as a major provocation. 
 
4.2 Turkish Identity and Demonization of the Greeks 
The Turks return the Greek compliment regarding barbarity and backwardness. 
It is claimed that the Greeks have committed an array of slaughters and other 
atrocities since 1821 (Millas, 1991: 26-7; Bölükbaşι, 2004: 13, 22, 32, 45-6); 
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that Greek society is ultra-nationalist; that the Greeks suffer from a deep-seated 
neurosis towards the Turks (Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1994: 37-46, 181-3) and a 
‘pathological enmity’ (Bölükbaşι, 2004:42). Moreover the Greek state is being 
run by the ‘backward Greek Church’ and its obscurantist priests (Berkes, 1984: 
125-38), a Church, which is the ‘bastion of the ‘Megali Idea’ which is still very 
much alive in Greece till this day (Bölükbaşι, 2004: 42). This is probably 
intended as a rebuttal of the Greek (and European) claim that they are 
‘barbarians’ and ‘terrible Turks’. Moreover the knowledge of the acts of 
barbarity committed by the other side that are little known in Greece or in the 
rest of the world (save by a handful of specialists) leads to outrage and a sense 
of being unjustly treated by their reference group, the ‘Europeans’. In particular 
the Turks cannot forgive Europe for ‘saving’ the Greeks in their ‘unlawful 
rebellion’ and doing so, among others, on humanitarian grounds, as if only the 
Ottoman Turks and Egyptians under Ibrahim had committed slaughters and 
atrocities in the 1820s.   
The main Turkish concern that is a cause for intense insecurity and has a 
bearing in Turkish self-identity is holding on to their territory and issues of 
sovereignty (Millas, 2004a: 55). This is due above all to being “burdened by 
memory of territorial losses” (International Crisis Group, No 64: 2) from the 
days of the Ottoman Empire, many of which were territories that were annexed 
to Greece, from 1830 until 1920. This is related to another surprising 
perception: that even though they have lived in the region for centuries (as 
Ottomans and from 1922 as Turks), they have a sense of not being an 
‘autochthonous element’ of the region but the ’latest comers’ (Soysal, 2004: 
42).11 Thus until today the Turks commemorate the conquest of Constantinople 
(every 29th of May) with great fanfare as if it was an event of recent history 
(and of course make no reference to the three-day plunder and destruction that 
followed the capture of the great city). As in the early days of Turkish 
                                                 
11
 The well-known Greek reference to ‘lost homelands’ regarding Anatolia exacerbates this Tutkish 
Angst and the belief that Greece remains irredentist till this day. See for instance comments in 
Bölükbaşι 2004:42. 
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nationalism even today many Turks feel more at home with the steppes of 
Central Asia as the land of their forefathers, or even the beyond, the unknown 
as homeland. As put by Gökalp in his famous 1911 poem ‘Turan’: ‘For the 
Turks Fatherland means neither Turkey nor Turkestan; Fatherland is a large 
and eternal country – Turan’. Moreover the Turks are more insecure than the 
Greeks at to their national identity because their sense of identity evolved 
belatedly and initially they were ‘a state in search of its nation’ (Kadioğlu, 
2009: 122).     
The greatest Turkish traumas are the aforementioned gradual territorial losses 
and the final abrupt loss of empire (with the first blow against the Ottoman 
edifice coming with Greek independence in 1830) and the 1920 Sèvres Treaty 
(the harsh and unfair carving up even of Anatolia proper in the Paris Peace 
Conference) coupled with the invasion of the Greeks (a former ʻsubject 
people’) with Allied approval into the Turkish heartland in 1919-22. This has 
given rise to the ‘Sèvres syndrome’, the fear of amputation and dismemberment 
of the motherland (Soysal, 2004: 41; Kirisçi, 2006: 32-8), which is regarded 
even today as the hidden agenda of the Greeks, but also of many Europeans (in 
this light EU membership is seen as catastrophic by many in Turkey today). 
Another phobia is the ‘Tanzimat syndrome’, portrayed as a generous offer of 
reforms in 1831-1876 that instead of stemming the tide of nationalist uprisings 
and foreign interventions did the very opposite, ultimately leading to the 
destruction of the Ottoman Empire (Yιlmaz, 2006: 29-40).  
As in the Greek case, Turkish narratives are not devoid of megalomania, as 
seen especially in the case of THT. But Turkey’s arrogance is not so much 
cultural, though the Turks deservedly take pride in Ottoman and Turkish 
cultural achievements (Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1994: 47-52). It is mainly the 
arrogance of power by comparison to other smaller neighbouring countries, 
such as Greece. This attitude is derived from the gravitas of the imperial 
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Ottoman past and Turkey's sheer size, military prowess and geopolitical clout.12 
This hardly disguised sense of superiority conceals a sense of inferiority, 
almost of powerlessness.  
Apart from the almost paranoiac fear of amputation, the Turks like the Greeks 
are prone to belief in ‘elaborate conspiracy theories depicting a world ganging 
up on them’ (Kirisçi, 2002: 40-1). In their great majority they are convinced 
that they have no true supporters world-wide (even though they have Turkic 
brethren across Asia). ‘The Turks have no friends’ is a well-known Turkish 
saying. Turkey is ‘surrounded by evil enemies’ (Kirisçi, 2002: 46; Gundogdu 
2001) in what is a very difficult neighbourhood. The counterpart of the 
‘Muslim arc in the Balkans’ of the Greeks is the notion of ‘Orthodox 
encirclement’, by Greece and its various allies who happen to be Orthodox 
(Gürel, 1999a: 126).  More generally the majority of Turks feel that they 
remain the ‘hated Other’ of Europe (as was the case during the Renaissance and 
the Enlightenment), the abominable ‘Great Turk’, contrary to the Greeks who 
are the ‘spoiled child of Europe’. Greece was created by outside forces and 
from then on until today continues to be supported by them (see Gürel, 1999a: 
14-17; Bölükbaşι, 2004:12-15, 23-4, 33-4).  
 
4.3 Additional Caveats 
On the whole the Greeks are obsessed by Turkey, by ‘the danger from the East’ 
(from Turkey). There is a paranoiac fear of Turkey (Mouzelis, 1994: 24-6; 
Heraclides, 2001). The dominant stereotype is that Turkey is equipped with an 
aggressive and bloodthirsty army (Cyprus-1974, the Kurds thereafter); and that 
the military continue to call the shots on vital national issues, in what is an 
ultra-nationalist society in the throes of militarism (Millas, 2005: 25-6).  
                                                 
12
 For haughtiness regarding Turkey’s geopolitical power see Ilhan 1989 (Ilhan, a former general, is a 
prolific author and lecturer on Turkish geopolitics) and more recently Davutoğlu, as an academic, 
before becoming foreign minister in 2009. See Davutoğlu 2001. For a critique of such approaches see 
Bilgin 2007: 740-56. 
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The Turks for their part are not equally obsessed by the Greeks nor are they 
equally fearful of the Greeks militarily (Gürel, 1993b: 163). At times Greece 
seems more of a nuisance than a real threat (Ergüder, 2002: 13-14; Belge, 
2004: 29). But by and large, the Greeks are regarded as aggressive nationalists. 
As a former Turkish diplomat has put it, ‘The so called “Turkish threat” is … 
intended to serve as a smokescreen’ for Greece’s attempts to ‘monopolize the 
Aegean’ (Bölükbaşι, 2004: 66). The Greeks - according to most Turks - have 
deep-down not abandoned the irredentist Great Idea, as seen in the case of 
trying to annex Cyprus until 1974 (Bölükbaşι, 2004: 43-8).  
The main Turkish fear of the Greeks is that they have extended international 
connections, including the very active Greek diaspora, especially in the United 
States (Kirisçi, 2002: 43; Bölükbaşι, 2004:17). Greek diplomacy and the Greek 
lobby in the United States and elsewhere have done their utmost to harm 
Turkey, to smear its reputation and diminish its international standing (Gürel, 
1993b: 167; Soysal, 2004: 43). Thus it would seem that the Greek fear of the 
Turks is more at the military-security level, while the Turkish fear is more at 
the diplomatic and international influence-propaganda plane. When it comes to 
a real military threat, Turkey is more fearful of an internal threat, from the 
PKK, but here again the Greek connection comes in (alleged Greek support to 
the PKK until early 1999). 
Another difference between Greeks and Turks is that Turkey and the Turks 
form an essential part of Greek self-identification, as the ‘negative Turk’. In the 
Turkish case this is the case but only in part (Isiksal, 2002: 1-8). The Turks are 
in need of a number of other negative ‘Others’: foremost of all (until recently, 
with the AKP Government and especially from 2009 with Ahmet Davutoğlu as 
foreign minister) the Arab world, which is seen as backward, undemocratic and 
prone to religious fundamentalism (Bozdağlioğlu 2003: 111-15) and to some 
extent the Iranians, the Armenians and the Russians. Turkish hate and 
animosity towards the Greeks is more nuanced. The Turks far more than the 
Greeks have been known to toy with the ‘black top enemy image’: that 
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politicians in Greece are responsible for kindling the flames of animosity; that 
the Greek people, if left to themselves, would be amicable toward the Turks 
(Millas, 2005: 30-1). In addition, the Turks are far more prone than the Greeks 
to refer to common ‘tastes, habits and behaviourʼ, not least in cuisine (Ergüder, 
2004: 13-14; Belge, 2004: 13), but also in folklore, music, dance and use of 
common words despite their obvious cultural differences based on language 
and religion (Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1994: 191). The Greeks abhor any such 
allusions, as do the Turkish-Cypriots when the Greek-Cypriots remind them of 
cultural similarities and lack of conflict between ‘Greeks’ and ‘Turks’ in the 
island until the early 1950s. 
 
5. Attitude Change, Paradigm Shift 
For the Greek-Turkish rivalry to be overcome and their differences settled, 
opening the road to a lasting reconciliation, there is an urgent need for attitude 
change and paradigm shift. Above all the undermining of their respective 
national mythologies is in order that will also find its echo in the school-texts 
of primary and secondary education. This is a delicate matter and should be 
done with the utmost of care, for a more likeable ‘Other’, worthy of recognition 
and respect is difficult to accept for it puts into doubt the cherished but insecure 
national identity and self-worth of the Greeks and Turks respectively, which is 
built, as we have seen, to a large extent on belittling the other side. Thus, in the 
first instance, a frontal attack on national narratives, for instance by presenting 
in detail ‘our’ extended gruesome acts against innocent unarmed people of the 
other side in the course of ‘our glorious’ war of independence, is inadvisable, at 
least in the first instance for it would tarnish ‘our glories irrevocably and 
damage self-worth and self-esteem. Probably a more pragmatic goal is to 
embark upon partial changes of the enemy image, by subtly undermining the 
extreme in-group - out-group polarisation, by among others familiarity with 
other side, reliable information and increased contacts.  
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As for contacts and greater familiarity, the totally unexpected popular Greek 
reactions to the August 1999 earthquakes in Ismit and the wider Marmara 
region which lead to ‘seismic diplomacy’ (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 39-89) is 
revealing. All of a sudden the Greeks saw through television and in the press, 
real Turks, in flesh and blood. The concrete Turks were very different from the 
imagined abstract Turk that the Greeks expected to see; they saw normal 
human beings suffering. Thus for the first time the image of the Turk ‘became 
blurred’ (Millas, 2004b: 23).And the Greeks instead of celebrating for the 
Turkish disasters (as one would have expected given the level of enmity) they 
lend them their support. On the Turkish side the Turks could not believe their 
very own eyes: the Greeks who supposedly hate them and want to do them 
harm came to their support and was vividly moved by their suffering 
(Gundogdu 2001). The episode was replayed in reverse three weeks later (in 
early September), when an earthquake hit Athens. Put differently, the 
respective original abstract images of what is a Turk or a Greek were so unreal 
and abominable that almost any contact with real Turks and Greeks 
respectively could not but have a positive effect, undermining, at least for a 
while, the negative stereotypes (Heraclides, 2002: 19).  
Ideally of course the two sides should be able to arrive at a new sense of 
collective identity and self-worth which is self-standing and does not need 
downgrading the out-group so as to appear convincing to the ingroup.  
From the perspective of International Relations, Greek-Turkish relations are in 
need of a paradigm shift along Kuhnian lines or critical thinking along the lines 
suggested by Alexander Wendt.13  What is in essentially a Schmitt paradigm 
needs to give way to a liberal, constructivist or reflectivist paradigm. A variant 
of the Schmitt approach is Realpolitik, still in vogue in Greece and Turkey, 
mainly the deterrence-security line and diplomatic pressure to corner the 
adversary, along zero-sum, win-lose thiking. Beneath the veneer of what is 
                                                 
13
 For an insightful presentation of the Greek-Turkish thaw of 1999 with the use of Wendt’s critical 
thinking and transformation, see Gundogdu 2001. 
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regarded as hard-nosed realism, such strategies conceal ethnocentric ‘patriotic 
moralism’ (Forde, 1992: 62), a ‘moral crusade’ (Mitchell, 1995: 27) where ‘our 
side’ is always right and just and the other side always on the wrong.  
I would suggest a seven-pronged strategy intended to gradually overcome the 
Greek-Turkish rivalry.  
One strategy could be to begin by showing how factually erroneous are certain 
perceptions of the other side and of its motivations in specific historical cases, 
past or present. For instance one could present the three crises regarding the 
Aegean, where the two sides reached the brink of war (in August 1976, March 
1987 and February 1996) and indicate beyond reasonable doubt that 
misperception and misjudgment reigned supreme, with neither side wanting the 
crisis in order to test ‘the enemy’, gain advantage or use brinkmanship tactics.14  
Then one could reveal the other side's suspicions and paranoiac fears of ‘us’ 
and then compare them with ‘our’ own, thereby amply revealing similarities 
(mirror images) and subtle differences. This input would hopefully temper 
either side's Angst and may, incidentally, reinforce one's collective ego by 
indicating how threatening one can be to the other side. More crucially it will 
put into question the pervading image that the other side is a constant threat and 
expansionist to boot. 
A parallel third road is to elaborate on the various mutual misperceptions 
manifest in all acute conflicts, such as the belief that the other side is far more 
hostile and the (mis)perceived greater cohesion and coordination of the 
adversary in what is a well-thought out and unflinching strategy aimed against 
‘us’ (Jervis, 1969: 239-54).  
                                                 
14
 For a balanced and revealing presentation of the 1987 and the 1996 crises see Vathakou 2003: 70-
110, 200-22.  
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A fourth step is to present, with revealing examples, the pernicious role of the 
press and media in both countries, with its selective, biased and often highly 
emotional and often inflammatory reporting and editorials.  
A fifth step is to reveal the ‘security dilemma’, namely the armaments, which 
are in place purely for defensive purposes, are seen as offensive in nature 
(Tsakonas 2001).  
Sixth, the fifth step could be coupled with a presentation of the malign role of 
‘groupthink' (Janis 1972) when hawkish views prevail as well the danger of 
‘self-fulfilling-prophesies' when constantly following a worst-cost scenario. 
And finally, once the recipient, Greek or Turk, is presumably less simplistic 
and bipolar in his/her approach, to engage in a bit of shock treatment, by first of 
all referring to specific acts of barbarity and cruelty by ‘civilised’ peoples (the 
British, the Americans, the Italians, the Spaniards or the Germans) and then 
make the extremely painful but ultimately necessary step to refer to at least 
some of the many despicable acts committed by Greeks and Ottomans/Turks 
respectively in the last 200 years. The aim is to indicate that acts of barbarity 
are not characteristic of ‘our’ enemy as the quintessential barbarian but acts 
committed even by peoples who regard themselves as ‘civilised’ and humane. 
Both sides (and all sides in violent conflicts) have at some historical point been 
cruel and beastly and in many instances have acted in a particular way – 
however condemnable and inhuman – in a war of liberation, for reasons of the 
state, for reasons of survival as they saw it, or to create a ‘pure ethnic state’ via 
ethnic cleansing. 
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